Ways out of the WTO's December crisis: how to prevent the open global trade order from unravelling by Daniels, Laura von et al.
www.ssoar.info
Ways out of the WTO's December crisis: how
to prevent the open global trade order from
unravelling
Daniels, Laura von; Dröge, Susanne; Bögner, Alexandra
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Daniels, L. v., Dröge, S., & Bögner, A. (2019). Ways out of the WTO's December crisis: how to prevent the open global
trade order from unravelling. (SWP Comment, 46/2019). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C46
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.




NO. 46 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
Ways Out of the WTO’s December Crisis 
How to Prevent the Open Global Trade Order from Unravelling 
Laura von Daniels, Susanne Dröge and Alexandra Bögner 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing the biggest crisis since its inception in 
1995. From 11 December, the committee that deals with WTO members’ appeals, the 
Appellate Body, will be left with only one judge. New appointments have been blocked 
by the United States. This will incapacitate the Body because the minimum require-
ment for any decision is three judges. What seems to be a mere procedural issue will 
result in major disruptions for international trade relations and might ultimately 
lead to the unravelling of the existing global trade order. The EU and like-minded 
partners have three options to cope with the situation and to safeguard the WTO’s 
role in trade dispute settlement. The EU and its partners could either endure the stale-
mate while aiming for a broader WTO reform. Or the EU could strive for an alter-
native appeals mechanism within the WTO, as an interim solution. The third option 
would be to seek dispute settlements outside of the WTO. None of the options comes 
without risk of failure since there is uncertainty about the US endgame, and each 
move could deliver proof for the US that the WTO no longer serves its interests. 
 
In June 2017, US representatives to the 
WTO in Geneva began blocking the launch 
of a selection process for new members of 
the WTO’s Appellate Body. This standing 
body conclusively settles disputes as a sec-
ond tier in the WTO binding dispute settle-
ment system. The Appellate Body is activated 
by member states in cases where a party 
objects to the initial findings of the first 
authority, the dispute settlement panel. 
The terms of three Appellate Body mem-
bers expired in 2017 and one has resigned, 
while the US continues to block new mem-
ber appointments. The Body is now left 
with only three of its usual seven judges. 
The reduced number of judges is already 
impairing the Appellate Body’s ability to 
function as it struggles to keep up with 
the workload. According to WTO rules, the 
minimum number of judges required to 
serve on any case is three. The Body will, 
therefore, be unable to hear appeals when 
the terms of two of the remaining Appellate 
Body members expire on 10 December this 
year. This would be tantamount to a col-
lapse of the second tier of the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement system. 
Between 1995 and 2014, dispute parties 
appealed 67 percent of all panel reports. If 
the Appellate Body does become incapaci-
tated, WTO members will be able to per-
manently block the adoption of any panel 
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rulings they object to by filing appeals 
that can no longer be heard. Under those 
circumstances, frustrated countries whose 
complaints remain in limbo may resort to 
taking unilateral countermeasures against 
alleged rule violations. As a result, disputes 
that are currently subject to the WTO dis-
pute settlement mechanism might trigger 
spirals of retaliation and small-scale trade 
wars. 
The WTO has two main pillars, one is 
the negotiation pillar which allows member 
states to change and add trade rules based 
on consensus from all member states. The 
second pillar is the dispute settlement sys-
tem. Thus, such a forced shutdown of the 
system could eventually add to an unrav-
elling of the global trade order. 
The WTO crisis: a recap 
A multitude of problems has been building 
up in the global trade regime over a period 
of almost three decades. The Trump admin-
istration’s open rejection of the regime, 
culminating in a breakdown of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM) – unavoida-
ble due to the required lead time of at least 
three months for new appointments – can 
also be traced back to these fundamentals. 
They include reform inertia in times of 
dynamic globalization and long-standing 
divisions between developing and devel-
oped countries. 
From GATT to the WTO 
In the 1990s, members of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947) 
concluded the Uruguay round of trade talks 
(1986–1994). This was the eighth successful 
round of talks on the liberalization of inter-
national trade in a row. Driven by the US 
under President Bill Clinton, the Uruguay 
round was eventually concluded and im-
plemented, bringing about substantial 
changes and reform in the overall archi-
tecture and scope of the multilateral trade 
regime. The EU, Japan and South Korea 
backed the Uruguay round agenda, although 
many developing countries did not. One 
major US objective was to curtail intellectual 
property theft by private and state-owned 
Chinese companies, but also securing patent 
rights for US firms active abroad (e.g. in 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture). This led 
to the TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) that 
was added to the GATT in 1994. Another 
breakthrough at the time was the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
which facilitated liberalization of services. 
The round was eventually concluded in 
1993 and signed by 123 governments in 
April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The 
delay was largely caused by the US and the 
EU disagreeing on agricultural trade, mar-
ket access, services and anti-dumping rules, 
and also over the creation of a full-blown 
organization dedicated to world trade. In 
the end, the WTO replaced the GATT as an 
organization in 1995, and functions as um-
brella for the reformed GATT (1994) and all 
other agreements that have existed as part 
of the negotiations since 1947. 
The dispute settlement system had 
already been streamlined as a result of the 
early phase of negotiations in 1988, when it 
was decided to undertake a new systematic 
and regular review of national policies and 
practices under the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism. 
Legacy of the Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round produced what is now 
known as a “built-in agenda” with further 
negotiations to follow after its conclusion. 
It also led to a change in the overall rela-
tions between developed and developing 
member states. The latter increased their 
activities in particular policy fields and 
became partners in a rising number of pref-
erential trade agreements. India, a GATT 
founding member, has been the leading 
developing country throughout the trade 
rounds. After the Tokyo Round (1979) it led, 
together with Brazil, a group of developing 
countries who voiced strong objections 
against a new round in the early 1980s, 
while the G7 countries were pushing 
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strongly in that direction. Developing coun-
tries had two demands, a rollback on GATT-
inconsistent measures and a standstill on 
new measures, which were mostly driven 
by the US. The speed and scope of the G7 
measures driving this process clashed with 
the limited capacities of the developing 
countries, but they also helped form com-
mon areas of interest. With the Uruguay 
Round this changed. Brazil and India 
started lagging behind global integration 
processes, which other countries had 
opened up to – including China, which 
was an observer from 1984 onwards and 
applied to join the GATT in 1986. 
The built-in agenda and the broadening 
of trade issues as backed by the US placed 
huge demands on most developing coun-
tries. The Doha Round, launched in Novem-
ber 2001, took up their calls for a new round 
combining the Marrakesh Agreement’s 
commitments to reopen talks on agricul-
ture and services. Due to the criticism 
voiced by developing countries during the 
earlier Uruguay Round, ministers decided 
to put development issues at the centre of 
negotiations (Doha Development Round). 
During these talks, a group of 20 (WTO 
G20) larger developing country WTO mem-
bers, including India, China, Indonesia and 
Mexico, openly challenged the dominance 
of the US and the EU in 2003 at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún. While 
the EU pushed for the Singapore issues 
(amongst them government procurement, 
trade facilitation, trade and investment and 
trade and competition), the US called for in-
dustrial tariff reductions by developing 
countries in return for lowering agricultural 
tariffs. 
In summer 2006, the talks collapsed, 
largely because the US, the EU, India, 
Brazil, Japan and Australia could not agree 
on agriculture (e.g. reduction of US sub-
sidies) and on a reduction of industrial 
tariffs according to the Swiss Formula, a 
tool used to calculate the tariff reduction 
rate. It marked yet another example of the 
changed geo-political realities. 
For years, the US has expressed numer-
ous concerns it has with the multilateral 
trade system, including the claiming of 
development country status by emerging 
economic champions like China and India. 
The US has also criticized the WTO’s gen-
eral inability to constrain market-distorting 
practices, such as subsidies and dumping, 
intellectual property theft and forced tech-
nology transfer, notably by China. WTO 
negotiations over these issues have been 
impeded by consensus requirements and, 
as the Trump administration argues, by 
“judicial activism” from the Appellate Body 
which encourages WTO members to seek 
privileges through litigation rather than 
negotiation. 
Changing US views on 
trade with China 
When China became a member of the 
WTO on 11 December 2001, its accession 
was initially applauded by free traders in 
both political parties in the United States. 
The Bill Clinton administration that had 
presided over the accession negotiations 
and much of the business community both 
expected huge benefits from declining im-
port prices and hence production costs. Fur-
thermore, the US was expecting large gains 
from entering Chinese services markets 
(telecommunications, finance, insurance). 
Washington’s decision to finally approve 
China’s accession to the WTO was by no 
means rushed. The US government has 
granted the Chinese conditional normal 
trade relations (the equivalent of WTO’s 
most favoured nation status) since 1979, 
subject to annual review and approval by 
Congress. 
A decade later, criticism of China’s acces-
sion to the WTO resurfaced in the US. What 
was mostly an academic debate about the 
size and significance of the “China shock” 
on local economic labour markets and 
growth, turned into a highly politicized 
debate on China’s aggressive economic 
policy and its harmful economic effects 
on the US, and necessary countermeasures 
the government should take. 
A turning point in US policy towards 
China had clearly been reached in Septem-
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ber 2009, when President Barack Obama 
introduced tariffs to stop what he described 
as a “harmful surge” of Chinese tyre im-
ports into the United States. The 2010 Trade 
Agenda noted several other Chinese trade 
practices that were hurting US companies, 
including unjustified restrictions on US 
exports of agricultural products, restrictions 
on winning distribution rights for Ameri-
can content companies in China, as well 
as Chinese export restrictions on raw ma-
terials needed by core US industrial sectors 
from steel and aluminium to chemicals. 
Between 2009 and 2016, the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) filed 
13 WTO complaints against China – all 
successfully settled or ruled in favour of the 
US. Moreover, the Obama administration 
placed numerous anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duties on Chinese goods starting 
in 2009. By September 2017, before Donald 
Trump came into office and placed unilate-
ral tariffs of 25 percent on steel and 10 per-
cent on aluminium in the spring of 2018, 
the measures taken earlier by the Obama 
administration were already shutting off 
Chinese steel imports from the US market 
almost entirely. 
What angered Washington during the 
Obama years as much as now was the fact 
that since 2002, the Appellate Body had 
ruled against Washington’s use of trade 
remedies in several landmark decisions. 
Beijing successfully challenged Washing-
ton’s use of “zeroing”, a technique used to 
calculate dumping margins for imports 
that are taken as a basis for remedies. Also, 
the Appellate Body ruled against the US’s 
use of “double remedy”, i.e. the simulta-
neous placement of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures on Chinese im-
ports. The Obama administration took this 
as proof that the body was “overreaching”. 
Beyond its dissatisfaction with remedy 
decisions, the USTR has repeatedly argued 
that existing WTO rules are insufficient to 
take China to court for violations of intel-
lectual property rights. 
Donald Trump is the first US President to 
challenge China outside of the WTO frame-
work. Not only has he repeatedly questioned 
the global organization’s ability to deal 
with China’s trade practices. The path of 
unilateral trade measures applied against 
Beijing is evidence that Washington prefers 
to “go it alone on China” rather than to 
cooperate with other countries. The US ap-
proach clearly undermines the WTO by im-
plementing unilateral US tariffs on Chinese 
imports and taking other non-trade meas-
ures and also by dealing with China almost 
entirely in bilateral rather than multilateral 
negotiations. 
The US blockage of the 
Appellate Body 
In 2016, due to its frustration with Appel-
late Body decisions against the US, the 
Obama administration blocked the reap-
pointment of an Appellate Body member 
over a period of six months. The EU repre-
sentative at the WTO in Geneva argued that 
the move was “unprecedented and poses a 
very serious threat to the independence and 
impartiality of current and future Appellate 
Body members.” Other members shared the 
EU’s criticism. 
The Trump administration has justified 
its unilateral blockage of new appointments 
to the Appellate Body in 2017 with a series 
of long-standing US grievances against the 
body. One major concern relates to what 
the US considers to be a disregard by the 
Appellate Body for the rules agreed by WTO 
members, and its overreach in adding to or 
diminishing members’ rights and obliga-
tions. Notably, the US laments that Appel-
late Body interpretations of WTO rules on 
subsidies, antidumping duties and counter-
vailing duties have significantly limited the 
US and other market economies’ ability to 
counter-act such trade-distorting practices, 
used mainly by China. 
Thus, the US aims to keep national au-
thority and control over the dispute settle-
ment process firmly with WTO member 
states in order to prevent infringements 
on national sovereignty. US representatives 
have regularly pointed to these concerns 
to explain their continued blockage of the 
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selection process for new Appellate Body 
members. Procedural concerns, such as 
disregard for the 90-day deadline for reports 
by the Appellate Body and the occasional 
continued service of its members on cases 
beyond the expiration of their terms with-
out explicit approval from WTO members, 
are often tied to substantive ones. Disregard 
for the time limit, for example, is problem-
atic in the US view not only because it im-
pedes the swift settlement of disputes, but 
also because it enables the Appellate Body 
to widen the scope of its reports instead of 
focusing solely on the issues on appeal. The 
US government seems to interpret a breach 
of procedural rules as facilitating overreach 
on substance. 
Uncertainty about the 
US endgame 
So far, the US has remained unmoved by 
two proposals to end its blockage of the 
Appellate Body, introduced by the EU and 
other WTO member states. At the WTO 
General Council meeting on 12 December 
2018, the US argued that proposals acknowl-
edged US concerns to some extent, but 
appeared to propose rule changes that 
would accommodate the very behaviour 
that was of concern to the US in the first 
place, and that would make the Appellate 
Body even less accountable and more sus-
ceptible to overreaching. Members did 
agree to launch an informal process under 
New Zealand’s stewardship as a parallel 
effort to the formal discussions at the 
monthly meetings. 
However, the stalemate over the appoint-
ment of new Appellate Body members is 
likely to continue. US representatives at the 
WTO dismissed calls to present their own 
reform ideas for the Body, arguing that it 
should simply follow existing rules. At the 
same time, USTR Robert Lighthizer has 
called the blocking of appointments to the 
Appellate Body the “only leverage” the US 
has in order to push reform at the WTO. 
During his testimony at a Senate hearing 
on the WTO’s future held on 12 March 
2019, Lighthizer indicated that US obstruc-
tive behaviour in the Dispute Settlement 
Body or lack of consent to the appointment 
of new Appellate Body members could also 
depend on other “things”. In the absence of 
any concrete suggestions by the US for the 
Appellate Body, however, it is difficult to 
determine what exactly it will take for the 
US to give up its blockage of the appoint-
ment process. On November 2019, the Trump 
administration also declared that it wanted 
to reduce its WTO membership contribu-
tions based on its grievances with Appellate 
Body decisions and an initiative by some 
WTO members to move on to jurist nomi-
nations without US consensus. Despite this 
bold announcement it remains hard to imag-
ine that the US would truly be willing to dis-
mantle a system which, according to Light-
hizer, it would after all be worse off without. 
How to save dispute settlement 
and reform WTO rules 
The EU and other WTO members need to 
prepare for a situation in which the US 
continues its blockage of the Appellate 
Body. Even if WTO members reached agree-
ment to replace Appellate Body members 
soon, it will take up to three months to 
actually appoint them. Given the situation, 
there are basically three options to con-
sider. 
Option 1: wait and support 
reform of the Appellate Body, 
on US terms 
The EU and its like-minded trade partners 
could accept the impasse at the Appellate 
Body for the time being and try to engage 
the Trump administration in negotiations 
over how to reform the Appellate Body. 
Proposals put forward by the EU and its 
partners tried to address US critique of the 
Appellate Body, including a last minute 
draft General Council decision with com-
prehensive changes in the rules governing 
dispute settlement understanding tabled 
by New Zealand Ambassador to the WTO, 
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David Walker. In this draft, member states 
declare that the Appellate Body has not 
been functioning as intended under the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the 
DSU) and agree to a list of amendments 
addressing long-stated US demands. It in-
cludes stricter transitional rules for out-
going Appellate Body Members, application 
of 90-day rule for completing reports and 
limitations on the scope of appeals. The 
proposed reform, however, may not yet 
sufficiently address US concerns about 
judicial overreach. To address this issue, 
some experts have suggested that WTO 
members could decide to aim for a closer 
link between the dispute settlement func-
tion and the role of the WTO as a negotiat-
ing forum. If a particular interpretation of 
WTO rules by the Appellate Body fails to 
reach a consensus, it would be referred to 
a specialized committee. In the end, the 
General Council could take a final decision 
based on a three-quarters majority vote 
of all member states (so called legislative 
remand). 
Alternatively, WTO member states could 
agree to put the most controversial type of 
Appellate Body decisions – those related to 
trade remedy actions like anti-dumping and 
countervailing actions – on hold for a lim-
ited amount of time, until a more perma-
nent compromise can be reached with the 
US. Since many of the US complaints vis-à-
vis the Appellate Body relate to decisions 
on trade remedy actions, one proposal sug-
gested permanently separating trade remedy 
from other cases in the dispute settlement 
system, either by creating a special Appel-
late Body for trade remedies or by placing 
a moratorium on appeals from panel deci-
sions on such cases. Such a special body 
could mirror the working procedures of the 
Appellate Body. Its members could have 
backgrounds in trade remedy law, ensuring 
sound rulings. It would split the current 
workload of the Appellate Body (trade rem-
edies disputes are 45 percent of all its cases). 
Such a restructuring of the Appellate Body 
would require an amendment to the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
Both of the proposals above would 
require a consensus among WTO members 
on a fundamental restructuring of the exist-
ing appeals process. However, it is unclear 
whether the US would be less concerned 
about judicial overreach by the suggested 
solutions and end its blockage, or whether 
China would agree to any of these proposals 
given that they mostly aim to accommodate 
US concerns. 
Option 2: work towards a 
different system for appeals 
inside the WTO 
A more proactive approach would be for 
the EU to form a coalition with other WTO 
members to preserve the current two-stage 
dispute settlement process and to temporar-
ily abandon consensus decisions. Member 
states, with the exception of the US, could 
move forward with selecting new Appellate 
Body members by qualified majority vote in 
the General Council. This way, members 
would depart from the regular process that 
requires a consensus vote in the WTO’s Dis-
pute Settlement Body. However, members 
could claim to be meeting their obligations 
(Art. 17.2 DSU “Vacancies shall be filled as 
they arise”). 
Another way to overcome the impasse 
would be for member states to draw on 
Article 25 of the DSU which allows WTO 
members to resort to arbitration as an alter-
native means of dispute settlement, the 
exact procedures of which would be deter-
mined by the dispute parties. Parties in a 
dispute could agree to arbitrate appeals 
before the panel issues its ruling and let the 
arbitration process mirror the process of 
appeals before the Appellate Body, e.g. by 
having arbitrators adopt the Working Pro-
cedures. The Appellate Body Secretariat 
could assist in the arbitration process and 
WTO rules on implementation of rulings 
(Art. 21 DSU) and compensation (Art. 22 
DSU) would apply to any arbitration 
awards. 
In recent bilateral agreements, the EU, 
Canada and Norway have pledged to accept 
Article 25 arbitration as binding. Since 
 SWP Comment 46 
 December 2019 
 7 
Article 25 DSU is an existing provision, no 
consensus vote is needed to use it, at least 
as interim solution. Nevertheless, this ap-
proach has several drawbacks. One risk 
attached to the flexibility under Article 25 
for smaller dispute parties to agree on pro-
ceedings is that powerful WTO members 
like China or the EU could push for rules 
that put them at an advantage. Less power-
ful members also have ways of blocking 
dispute settlement when they anticipate an 
unfavourable panel ruling. They could still 
refuse arbitration and block the adoption 
of the panel report by filing for appeal with 
the incapacitated Appellate Body. Those 
cases would remain in limbo for years to 
come. For all of the above reasons, there is 
uncertainty about how viable this solution 
would be in practice. 
Therefore, a plurilateral arbitration 
agreement, binding participating countries 
to a specified arbitration process ahead of 
new disputes might be a better option. It 
would take more time and political capital 
to achieve. With the stalemate of the Appel-
late Body approaching, the Trump adminis-
tration has been increasing political pres-
sure on member states. In a meeting in 
Geneva on 13 November, the US govern-
ment representative named steps by other 
member states away from consensus voting 
as a reason for current US plans to cut or 
even fully withdraw financial contributions 
to the 2020–2021 budget. Others have 
warned that a move to Art. 25 arbitration 
could even be taken as justification for 
President Trump to follow up on his threats 
to leave the WTO. 
The benefits of a plurilateral agreement 
on Article 25 arbitration would crucially 
depend on China’s participation. For an 
agreement to gain traction without US par-
ticipation, it would need to include China. 
According to the ChinaPower Project, China 
was involved in 63 disputes with 9 econo-
mies from the time it acceded to the WTO 
in 2001 through 2018. Bejing has been the 
complainant 20 times and the respondent 
43 times. So far, the EU has brought 35 
cases against the US and nine cases against 
China at the WTO, including recent com-
plaints over US tariffs on European steel 
and aluminium, and forced technology 
transfer in China.  
Option 3: aim for dispute 
settlement outside of the WTO 
If no consensus on a way forward on 
dispute settlement can be reached within 
the WTO, the EU might draw on its bi-
lateral and regional free trade agreements, 
like the EU-Canada agreement (CETA). How-
ever, the EU’s existing bilateral and pluri-
lateral agreements provide little, if any, 
legal protection in state-to-state-litigation 
cases beyond what is granted under WTO 
rules. What some of these agreements en-
tail are rules on how to proceed in cases 
where private parties want to take legal 
steps against a government, known as 
Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS)-
procedures. 
Due to recent agreements with Singapore 
and Vietnam and a preliminary agreement 
with the MERCOSUR countries, the share 
of EU external trade covered by these agree-
ments is expected to increase beyond the 
2017 status of around 30 percent to around 
40 percent. Nevertheless, trade with major 
partners, including the US and China, 
which together account for roughly a third 
of the EU’s external trade, still takes place 
under WTO rules. EU agreements with both 
countries in the near future are far from 
certain. 
Another yet more ambitious and politi-
cally costly option for the EU would be to 
sound out if other countries would choose 
to be part of a parallel state-to-state dispute 
settlement system, outside of the WTO. As 
in the case of Art. 25 arbitration, such a 
move could be taken as justification for 
President Trump to leave the WTO. More-
over, it might alienate even those actors 
in the US who have criticized the Trump 
administration’s policy towards the WTO 
and argued in favour of the multilateral 
trade order. It would make past pledges by 
the EU and others to do everything in their 
might to preserve WTO dispute settlement 
system look less credible. 




The EU will have to find levers and think of 
the right incentives to get the US and China 
back to the negotiation table to preserve 
and reform the WTO, which would be in its 
own best interest. In the short run, to limit 
the Appellate Body impasse to a minimum, 
the EU can draw on arbitration procedures 
in its existing trade and investment agree-
ments with other states. But a more viable 
solution would be for the EU and others to 
resort to Art. 25 arbitration inside the WTO 
framework, ideally by joining a plurilateral 
agreement. A temporary solution outside 
the WTO would be helpful only to handle 
disputes with parties who share the same 
interest in preserving the WTO (and ideally 
are connected to the EU in regional trade 
agreements). However, by resorting to a 
dispute settlement mechanism outside of 
the WTO, the EU risks undermining its 
previously stated commitment to the reso-
lution of trade disputes at the WTO through 
binding two-level, independent and impar-
tial adjudication by a Standing Appellate 
Body. 
For a viable solution, exerting pressure 
on the US will be a difficult undertaking as 
long as the US trade policy makers are able 
to put considerable pressure on its major 
trading partners, China and the EU. One 
option for resolving the WTO situation 
should be tested with China. This, however, 
will come at a cost. For instance, China could 
request that the EU approves the Chinese 
WTO status as a market economy, some-
thing which Brussels has so far refused to 
do for largely the same reasons as the US, 
chief among them being grievances over 
heavy state intervention in the economy, 
subsidies, treatment of intellectual property 
and forced technology transfer. Beijing 
could also ask for an easing of investment 
controls and access to the EU internal 
market. 
In any diplomatic attempts to approach 
the US and China, the EU Commission has 
to consider which way forward would limit 
the current and future cost to the European 
economy. The EU should continue to work 
together with other trade partners like 
Japan, Canada Mexico, and India – for in-
stance by discussing long and short-term 
options and finding a common understand-
ing of how to tactically approach the US 
government. 
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